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ABSTRACT
We analyze a vertically differentiated market, assuming that conventional and green
ﬁrms’ products have different impacts on the environment. Heterogeneous con-
sumers choose to be supplied by a conventional or a green ﬁrm, depending on their
extra willingness to pay for a green product and the relative prices of the prod-
ucts in the market. We show that environmental awareness campaigns may have a
negative impact on total welfare. This possibility is shown to exist without con-
sumer misperceptions about the quality of green products and ruling out changes
in the coverage and the structure of the market. Surprisingly, both conventional
and green ﬁrms may beneﬁt from heterogeneity-enhancing awareness campaigns,
while social welfare is more likely to be enhanced by heterogeneity-reducing ones.
Keywords: Vertical differentiation, WTP for green products, environmental
awareness campaigns.
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INTRODUCTION
In their role as consumers, citizens of developed countries are becoming increasingly
aware of the problems associated with the deterioration of the environment due to the
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functioning of the market. As a consequence, they exhibit some preference for green
products and processes, expressed in an increased willingness to pay (WTP) for them.
In modern societies, economic policy needs to be innovative as to the instruments that
should be used in order to favor the emergence of the desired outcomes. Beyond taxes
and subsidies, governments increasingly use advertising techniques in order to educate
citizens with principles leading the society and the economy along the desired path.
It is commonly accepted as obvious that increasing the consumers’ awareness towards
environmental issues is monotonically beneﬁcial for the society and proﬁtable for green
producers. For example, Endres (1997) proposes the use of state campaigns aimed at
awakening people’s ecological awareness. However, there are only a few studies focusing
on the negative effects that such campaignsmay have on the economic and environmental
performance of product markets.
Toour knowledge, the social desirability of increasing the consumers’ ecological aware-
ness has been already challenged, mainly on the basis of two arguments: ﬁrst, consumers’
wrong perception of a green product’s quality and, second, themonopolization or incom-
plete coverage of the market due to consumer awareness-related advantages gained by
green ﬁrms in the market. In the following paragraphs, we review these two arguments
and brieﬂy describe a totally different argument which is formalized in this paper.
The ﬁrst argument against the universal desirability of increasing the consumer’s
ecological awareness is proposed by Conrad (2005) in the framework of a horizontally
differentiated duopoly. The author argues that the social value of the environmental
damage caused by marketed products may be overestimated by the consumer. In that
case, an information campaign aimed at increasing the consumer’s willingness to pay for
ecological products would be socially undesirable. We will refer to this argument as the
consumer misperception argument. Our approach differs from that of Conrad (2005) in
two ways. First, we assume that environmental differentiation is of the vertical rather
than of the horizontal type. That is, rather than letting consumers have different ideal
varieties, we assume that consumers unanimously accept the superiority of the green
product over its conventional substitutes, although they differ in their willingness to
pay for a greener product. Second, rather than comparing consumers’ heterogeneous
and, in general, erroneous perception of a product’s environmental damage with an
exogenously imposed correct one, we assume that consumers only differ in their WTP
for an improvement in a product’s environmental quality but not in the perception of the
quality itself. With respect to this second difference between our framework and that in
Conrad (2005), we feel that our approach has the advantage that it does not suffer from
the problem of showing the existence of socially undesirable ecological awareness, based
on an exogenously imposed discrepancy between objective and subjective environmental
quality differences.
The vertical differentiation framework which we adopt here is related to the model
recently introduced in García-Gallego and Georgantzís (2009). Apart from their dif-
ference in the way in which qualities are reﬂected on production costs, the two papers
differ from each other in the arguments offered on the reason why increases in the con-
sumers’ ecological awareness may be socially undesirable. Speciﬁcally, in García-Gallego
and Georgantzís (2009) it is shown that increasing the consumers’ ecological awareness
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may have two effects on the resulting market outcome. First, it may lead from com-
plete to incomplete market coverage. That is, consumers’ increased willingness to pay
for a product’s environmental quality may lead to higher equilibrium prices, at which
some of the consumers cannot buy the good at all. Second, increasing the consumers’
ecological awareness may imply a sufﬁciently large advantage to a green ﬁrm, for it to
become a monopolist in the market. We will refer to the possibility of incomplete market
coverage and that of market monopolization under the generic term changes in market
structure or, simply, structural changes. Whereas we feel that the possibility of such struc-
tural changes may be relevant for many markets, there is a plethora of cases in which
the aforementioned structural changes are very unlikely to occur, following an increase
in the consumers’ ecological awareness. For example, in the real world, consumers may
substitute one product with another based on their environmental consciousness and the
relative prices of alternative products in the market, but it is more difﬁcult to ﬁnd exam-
ples of consumers not buying a certain good at all because of an increase in their ecological
awareness. Similarly, it is rather difﬁcult to ﬁnd examples of markets monopolized by
the greenest manufacturer, following an increase in consumers’ ecological awareness.
Numerous studies report results on hypothetical and revealed measures of WTP for
ecological products.1 A look at few recent examples conﬁrms two stylized facts which are
central to our analysis. First, consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their WTP
for ecological products.2 Second, there is an increasing trend of consumers world-wide
to prefer ecological products over their standard (non-ecological) substitutes.3
We adopt theﬁrst of these two facts—consumerheterogeneity—as an assumption in a
modelwhich can be used to obtain the conditions for proﬁtability and social desirability of
increasing the consumer’sWTP for ecological products.4 Taste heterogeneity is assumed
in most theoretical models studying the role of consumers’ ecological awareness on
market equilibrium.Heterogeneitymay concern consumers’WTP for ecological product
attributes, as in Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002), or some other consumer-
speciﬁc feature like their income, as in Arora and Gangopadyhay (1995) and Bansal
and Gangopadyhay (2003) or their ideal product variety, as in Conrad (2005). The
theoretical framework most frequently used to reach economic and environmental policy
recommendations is that of vertical product differentiation attributed to Mussa and
Rosen (1978). All these studies take the distribution of tastes as given, in order to reach
1 For example, Camacho et al. (2004), elicit hypothetical and incentive compatible WTP for a recy-
clable ofﬁce table, showing that survey data are a good predictor of a consumer’s median WTP for
an improvement in the environmental performance of a product.
2 The existence and causes of such heterogeneity are studied, for example, in Daniere (1994), Blamey
(1997), Loureiro and Lotade (2005). Nyborg’s (2000) framework provides a theoretical background
for such differences in ecological consciousness as combinations of homo oeconomicus and homo
politicus in a consumers’ utility function.
3 Pham and Rambo (2003), Harris (2006), Suzuki et al. (2004) and Tsagarakis and Georgantzís (2002)
document the increasing trend of ecological consciousness in four different countries: Vietnam,
China, Japan andGreece, respectively. In fact, the last two explicitly deal with the role of information
in people’s willingness to accept costlier options favoring environment friendlier market outcomes.
4 This assumption relates to similar ones adopted by von der Fehr and Stevik (1998) and Bloch and
Manceau (1999) to model persuasive advertising in a framework of horizontal differentiation.
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recommendations concerning other more orthodox policy instruments, like minimum
environmental quality standards, environmental taxes and subsidies.5
Our analysis pays special attention to increases in consumers’ ecological awareness,
which may affect the heterogeneity of tastes. We show that private proﬁtability is, gen-
erally speaking, enhanced by changes in the consumer’s WTP for ecological products, if
such changes increase consumer heterogeneity. On the contrary, social welfare is more
likely to be enhanced by increases in the consumer’s WTP leading to lower degrees of
consumer heterogeneity.Campaigns targeted towards increasing the ecological awareness
of themost environmentally conscious consumers will be of the heterogeneity-enhancing
type, whereas increasing the least environmentally conscious consumers’ WTP for eco-
logical products will typically reduce consumer heterogeneity. We show that the socially
undesirable type of WTP changes will often beneﬁt producers of both green and brown
products. The policy implications of this argument are straightforward: the state cannot
rely upon private campaigns aiming at increasing the consumer’s ecological awareness,
because ﬁrms would beneﬁt from increasing consumer heterogeneity by funding cam-
paigns targeting the most environmentally conscious of the consumers. On the contrary,
state campaigns should aim at increasing the ecological awareness of the least environ-
mentally conscious consumers.
The paper is organized in the following way: The ﬁrst section presents the model and
the main results. In the second section, we discuss the robustness of our results with
respect to several generalizations. The ﬁnal section concludes.
THE MODEL
Two ﬁrms, a and b, sell two products which are identical in all other aspects, except for
their performance with respect to the natural environment. In fact, the two product’s
environmental performances are assumed to be, respectively, Sa and Sb, which are engi-
neering (objective) measures of the reduction in the negative impact of each product
unit on the environment. Therefore, a product’s environmental performance is assumed
to correspond to a positive rather than a negative6 number measuring the reduction
in the environmental damage caused by a green product compared to that caused by a
unit of the standard product. Given the assumption of our model concerning the com-
plete coverage of the market by the sales of the two products, implying constant overall
consumption, this measure quantiﬁes the marginal reduction in the total environmental
5 See for example, Constantatos and Sartzetakis (1999) on environmental taxes, Motta and Jacques
François (1999) on environmental quality standards, Nadaï and Morel (1999) on ecolabeling. On
these policy instruments Lyon and Maxwel (2002) provide a very insightful overview with special
emphasis on the existing empirical ﬁndings.
6 That is, following the terminology in Garella and Lambertini (1999), environmental performance
is a good rather than a bad characteristic and could represent, for example, the inverse of a prod-
uct’s undesirable environmental externality, or, as we assume here, as the reduction in the negative
externality of each product unit on the environment due to a product’s better environmental per-
formance.
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damage as compared to the case in which the market would be fully covered by the sales
of the standard product, in which case the overall damage would be maximized. Without
loss of generality, a is the green product, while the environmental performance of the
standard product, b, is normalized to zero. That is, Sa > Sb = 0.
The population of potential (and actual, given the full market coverage assumption)
consumers is M. Each consumer i maximizes her utility Ui , demanding a maximum of
one unit of product from ﬁrm j ∈ {a, b} whose product quality and price satisfy:
Ui = max{R + νi · Sa − Pa,R − Pb, 0} (1)
where R > 0 is the utility enjoyed by the consumer from consuming one product
unit, before the difference in the two products’ environmental qualities is taken into
account. That is, apart from standard consumption utility, R also accounts for the con-
sumers’ loss of utility from consuming a product which damages the environment, but
not for the consumer’s extra “feel-good” effect emerging from the consumption of the
less damaging environmentally friendly product. This is heterogeneous and is mod-
eled by the consumer-speciﬁc parameter vi capturing consumer i’s WTP for a marginal
improvement in the green product’s environmental quality. The parameter is uniformly
distributed along the interval [m, n] (m ≥ 0, n > m) with density d. We introduce the
notation L = n−m, which is the length of the segment along which consumer tastes are
uniformly distributed or, alternatively, the consumer heterogeneity parameter. Note that
d · (n − m) = d · L = M. The term Pj denotes the price ﬁxed by ﬁrm j. Furthermore,
we assume that R and Sa are sufﬁciently high, so that, in equilibrium, the possibility of
consumers with zero consumption or ﬁrms with zero sales is ruled out.7 Then, for a pair
of prices (Pa,Pb) which are not too different from each other, there will be a consumer
i0, whose environmental consciousness parameter v0 ∈ [m, n], makes her indifferent
between the green and the standard product:
v0 · Sa − Pa = −Pb ⇒ v0 = Pa − PbSa (2)
Any consumer with v < v0 (v > v0) will feel that the price difference is too high (low)
as compared with the environmental performance difference between the two products
and she will buy the standard (green) variety. We use this fact and Equation (2) to write
the two ﬁrms’ demands:
qa = (n − v0) · d =
[
n − Pa − Pb
Sa
]
· d
qb = (v0 − m) · d =
[
Pa − Pb
Sa
− m
]
· d
(3)
7 García-Gallego and Georgantzís (2009), based on Liao (2008), observe that full market coverage
outcomes will not emerge in equilibrium if environmental quality is reﬂected on ﬁxed production
costs, while they may emerge in equilibrium if quality affects variable production costs, which is
the assumption made here.
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Unit and total production costs are assumed to be zero, except for c which is an extra
unit production cost paid by the manufacturer of the more ecological product. Using this
assumption and the expressions in Equation (3), we obtain the corresponding proﬁt
functions:
a = (Pa − c) ·
[
n − Pa − Pb
Sa
]
· d
b = Pb ·
[
Pa − Pb
Sa
− m
]
· d
(4)
Firms set prices to maximize individual proﬁts. The corresponding Bertrand–Nash
equilibrium will satisfy the standard ﬁrst order conditions giving rise to the system of
reaction functions:
∂a/∂Pa = 0 ⇒ Pa = c + n · Sa + Pb2
∂b/∂Pb = 0 ⇒ Pb = Pa − m · Sa2
(5)
whose solution yields the following equilibrium prices:
Pea =
1
3
[2 · c + (2n − m) · Sa]
Peb =
1
3
[c − (2m − n) · Sa]
(6)
and the corresponding equilibrium outputs:
qea = d ·
(2n − m) · Sa − c
3 · Sa
qeb = d ·
c − (2m − n) · Sa
3 · Sa
(7)
Equilibrium outputs will be positive as long as 2n − m > c/Sa > 2m − n. That is,
the extra unit cost of the green product is neither too high nor too low relative to the
corresponding improvement in environmental performance for the green or the standard
product, respectively, to be driven out of the market. This condition guarantees that, in
equilibrium, there will be a consumer who is indifferent between the two products (or
that both ﬁrms have positive sales). That is, m < ve0 = (m+n)3 + c3Sa < n. The condition is
necessary for our analysis to be meaningful, given that we do not consider discontinuities
like, for example, the case in which one of the two ﬁrms is driven out of the market,
emerging when the indifferent consumer’s taste coincides with one of the extremes of
the support of consumer preferences.
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Then, equilibrium proﬁts are given by:
ea = d ·
[(2n − m) · Sa − c]2
9 · Sa
eb = d ·
[c − (2m − n) · Sa]2
9 · Sa
(8)
We observe that, while equilibrium quantities and proﬁts depend on consumer density
(and the total population of consumers), equilibrium prices and, thus, the environmental
awareness of the indifferent consumer depend on relative rather than absolute character-
istics of consumer distributions. Observation of equilibrium magnitudes in expressions
(6)–(8) reveals the standard properties of this family of vertical product differentiation
duopoly, according to which the high quality ﬁrm has a higher price, a higher market
share and, thus a higher equilibrium proﬁt than its low quality competitor.
Proﬁtability of Changes in the WTP of Consumers
First, we study the effect of changes in the WTP of consumers on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. As
stated earlier, we concentrate on three types of WTP’s changes: (1) those which increase
the environmental awareness, without affecting consumer heterogeneity, (2) changes that
increase the consumers’ environmental consciousness and, at the same time, increase
consumer heterogeneity and (3) changes that increase the consumers’ environmental
awareness but decrease consumer heterogeneity.
The population density d = M/(n−m) may, also, be expressed in terms ofL = (n−m)
as d = M/L. It will be useful to write equilibrium proﬁts as a function of M, m and L,
in order to study changes in WTP affecting equally the WTP of all consumers, which
corresponds to an increase in m, keeping M and L constant (ﬁrst type):
Hea(m,L) = M ·
[(m + 2L)Sa − c]2
9 · L · Sa
Heb (m,L) = M ·
[c − (m − L)Sa]2
9 · L · Sa
(8.1)
The same expressions can be used to study changes in WTP which increase consumer
heterogeneity modeled as an increase in L, keeping m and M constant (second type).
Finally, it will be useful to write proﬁts in terms of m, n and M in order to study
changes in WTP which decrease consumer heterogeneity modeled as an increase in m,
keeping n and M constant (third type):
ea(m, n) = M ·
[(2n − m) · Sa − c]2
9 · (n − m) · Sa
eb(m, n) = M ·
[c − (2m − n) · Sa]2
9 · (n − m) · Sa
(8.2)
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Then, the derivatives of the expressions in (8.1) with respect to m, ﬁrst, and then with
respect to L would give us the effect of the ﬁrst two types of changes on ﬁrms’ proﬁts
for a given population Mof consumers:
∂Hea/∂m = 2M ·
[(m + 2L) · Sa − c]
9L
∂Heb/∂m = 2M ·
[(m − L) · Sa − c]
9L
∂Hea/∂L = −M ·
[(m + 2L) · Sa − c] · [(m − 2L) · Sa − c]
9 · Sa · L2
∂Heb/∂L = −M ·
[(m + L) · Sa − c] · [(m − L) · Sa − c]
9 · Sa · L2
(9.1)
Similarly, the derivatives of the expressions in (8.2) with respect to m will give us the
effect of the third type of changes on ﬁrms’ proﬁts, for a given M:
∂ea/∂m = M ·
[c − m · Sa] · [c − (2n − m) · Sa]
9 · Sa · (n − m)2
∂eb/∂m = M ·
[c − (3n − 2m) · Sa] · [c − (2m − n) · Sa]
9 · Sa · (n − m)2
(9.2)
From the signs of the derivatives in Equations (9.1) and (9.2) and some simple algebra
we reach our main result concerning private proﬁtability:
Proposition 1 Firm a always beneﬁts from WTP’s changes of the ﬁrst two types. The third
type will beneﬁt ﬁrm a, only if m · Sa > c. With respect to ﬁrm b, the ﬁrst and the third
types of WTP’s changes will always reduce its proﬁts. The second type will beneﬁt ﬁrm b if
n · Sa > c.
Following this result, in order for both ﬁrms to beneﬁt fromWTP’s changes increasing
the heterogeneity of consumers (second type), themost environmentally aware consumer
in the market must sufﬁciently value the superiority of the green product to justify the
extra production costs paid by the manufacturer of the green product. This is a rather
weak condition as compared to the condition for proﬁtability of the third type of WTP
changes for the green ﬁrm. It requires that the least environmentally aware among the
consumers, to be willing to pay for a unit of the green product more than the extra unit
cost of producing it. In fact, if a better environmental performance is not reﬂected on
unit production costs, that is c = 0, the former of the two conditions holds always,
whereas the latter of the conditions is never satisﬁed.
In the real world, the actual trends deﬁnitely favor increases in WTP for ecological
products. As we have argued, these trends may have different effects on consumers with
different attitudes towards the product’s characteristics. Proposition 1 shows that the
effect of a certainWTPchange on consumerheterogeneitywill determine its proﬁtability.
According to Proposition 1, under reasonably general conditions, both ﬁrms beneﬁt
from changes increasing consumer heterogeneity, whereas none of them would gain
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from changes decreasing consumer heterogeneity, unless a rather strong condition holds,
under which the manufacturer of the more ecological between the two products beneﬁts
only. On the contrary, ﬁrms have opposite interests with respect to changes in WTP
leaving consumers heterogeneity unchanged. As we would have expected, changes in
consumers’ WTP which uniformly increase all consumers’ environmental awareness,
beneﬁts the green ﬁrm and harms the conventional one. In order to gain intuition on
the comparative statics driving these results, we should have in mind that consumers’
heterogeneity plays a similar role to product differentiation. When consumers are more
heterogeneous, the power of the two ﬁrms over their corresponding segments of the
market increases, and competition is relaxed.
Predictions Concerning Observable Data: Prices and Market Shares
Although the main focus of the paper concerns the proﬁtability and social desirability of
increasing the consumers’ ecological awareness, we brieﬂy8 review here some straight-
forward comparative statics of our model concerning other observable magnitudes like
prices and market shares.
Interestingly, only changes of the second type increase the price of both the prod-
ucts. The ﬁrst type has opposite effects on the two products’ equilibrium prices. As we
would have expected, changes which uniformly increase all consumers’ WTP for quality,
will increase the price of the green product and decrease the price of the brown one.
Changes of the third type in consumers’ WTP increase competition between the two
ﬁrms by decreasing consumer heterogeneity, thus decreasing equilibrium prices. In all
cases, increases in the WTP for ecological products will increase the difference between
equilibrium prices.
The green ﬁrm’smarket shareweakly increases in the presence of any of the three types
of changes considered here. In the case of type 1 changes, the positive relation between
the green ﬁrm’s price and market share explains a fact often reported in empirical work
on differentiated markets. A combination of lower prices and higher market shares in
the case of the third type would be compatible with the contrary phenomenon, that is,
a negative correlation between market shares and prices. However, this phenomenon
would be reversed, if relative, rather than absolute, prices were taken into account. In
the presence of type 3 changes, it is the increase in the green ﬁrm’s market share that
may compensate (under the ﬁrst condition in Proposition 1) the ﬁrm’s losses due to
lower prices and make this type of changes proﬁtable for the green ﬁrm. A similar
correlation between market shares and prices is expected to emerge in equilibrium for
the conventional ﬁrm. Therefore, we would expect a far more systematic (positive)
correlation between market shares and relative (rather than absolute) prices.
Future empirical studies could be guided by these predictions on observable data.
8 Given that all the comparative statics discussed here are straightforward consequences of obtaining
the sign of the derivatives of equilibrium magnitudes with respect to the corresponding parameters
of the model, we omit the analytical derivation of these results which are available upon request
from the authors.
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Social Welfare Implications
In order to discuss welfare and policy implications of our results, wewill need to calculate
social welfare. Expressed in monetary units, this will be given by consumers’ total WTP
for the standard product (M · R) minus the objectively evaluated ﬁxed environmental
damage,D, reduced by the damage avoided due to the consumption of the green product,
net of the corresponding extra production cost. To this, we must add the extra surplus
enjoyed by the consumers of the environmentally friendly product due to the feel-good
effect from green consumption which raise their WTP for it in the ﬁrst place. Given that
this effect does not make consumers deviate from selﬁsh utility maximization, yielding
a higher surplus to more ecologically conscious consumers, it cannot be considered to
be a commitment in the sense of Sen’s (1977) famous paper on rational fools. In fact,
in terms of the approach by Harsanyi (1955), the aforementioned effect is the part
of the consumers’ subjective extra welfare from the consumption of environmentally
friendly products, which is not accounted for in the objective (engineering) evaluation
of the damage avoided due to green consumption. Finally, observe that, with full market
coverage, prices are an internal monetary transfer from consumers to producers, with
no effect total social welfare.
It is important to notice that the social welfare calculated below is measured in mon-
etary units, like is each one of its three main components: total WTP for the standard
product; the environmental damage net of the reduction due to green consumption,
which in its turn is net of the corresponding extra costs; and the overall feel-good effect
perceived by the consumers of the green product. The expression of the social welfare
function in terms of monetary units allows us to make meaningful comparisons between
the states before and after the change in consumers’ environmental consciousness takes
place.
Combining the elements described above, we express below social welfare in terms of
m and L. Some algebra gives us the following expression (10):
SW =
Overall
WTP
for
stndrd.prod︷ ︸︸ ︷
M · R −
Env.Damage︷ ︸︸ ︷

D − d · (Sa − c) · (m + L − v0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Damage
redctn.−
redctn. cos t


+
“Feel − good”
effect
from
green
consumptn.︷ ︸︸ ︷
d ·
∫ m+L
v0
vSadv
(from (2)) = M · R − D + d
×
[
(Sa − c) ·
(
m + L − Pa − Pb
Sa
)
+ Sa
2
·
(
(m + L)2 − (Pa − Pb)
2
S2a
)]
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Provided that the result obtained from our welfare analysis aims at offering an illus-
tration of the deviation between private and social beneﬁts from increasing consumers’
WTP for the green product, we simplify the analysis by introducing the normaliza-
tion: Sa = 1. Then, the condition for survival of both ﬁrms in equilibrium becomes:
m < c < n, which implies a plausible situation in which the most environmentally
aware consumer believes that the extra cost of producing the ecological product is justi-
ﬁed, whereas the least environmentally aware one believes it is not. Remember that this
assumption corresponds to the interesting case according to which the second type of
WTP changes positively correlates with both ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts.
With all this in mind, we reach our main result concerning the welfare implications
of changes in the consumers’ WTP for a more ecological product:
Proposition 2 If (and only if) m > m∗ = 5c−7L−35 , social welfare is positively affected by
WTP changes of the ﬁrst type. Similarly, if (and only if) L > L∗ =
√
(c−m)[5(c−m)−6]
8 , social
welfare is positively affected by WTP changes of the second type. Finally, the third type of
changes in WTP has an unambiguous positive effect on social welfare.
Therefore, the third type of changes in WTP is the only one of the three types
considered here which has an unambiguously positive effect on social welfare. The other
two types behave in a qualitatively similar way to each other. That is, increasing the
consumer’s WTP for the environmental performance of a product is unambiguously
socially desirable, as long as the consumers are, initially, willing to pay a sufﬁciently high
price for it.
Note that the assumptions under which we study social welfare (n > c > m), together
with Proposition 1, imply that the third type of changes in WTP cannot be proﬁtable for
ﬁrm a and that the second type is unambiguously proﬁtable for b.Under these conditions,
we can interpret the preceding welfare analysis in terms of compatibility between private
and social incentives:
• As far as changes in m are concerned (for a given degree L of consumer heterogeneity),
any effort undertaken by ﬁrm b (ﬁrm a) in order to decrease (increase) the consumer’s
marginal WTP for quality is socially desirable, as long as m < m∗ (m > m∗).
Also, let us deﬁne L∗∗ = c − m, which is obtained from Proposition 1, by rearranging
the condition: c < (m + L) · Sa and substituting Sa = 1. Then,
• Regarding changes in L, both ﬁrms’ interests would be (in)compatible with higher
levels of social welfare if L > L∗∗ (L < L∗), whereas, for L∗ < L < L∗∗, only the
green ﬁrm’s proﬁtability is compatible with higher levels of social welfare.
As shown in the Appendix, m∗ and L∗ correspond to local minima of equilibrium
social welfare. In the cases in which m∗, L∗ fail to fall within the ranges required by the
conditions of the model, social welfare is unambiguously positively affected by changes
of the ﬁrst two types.
Therefore, private and social incentives may coincide only for high degrees of initial
taste dispersion.
82 García-Gallego and Georgantzís
• Finally, although changes of the third type are — under the assumptions made here —
unambiguously socially desirable, our results predict that ﬁrmswill notmake any effort
favoring this type of change.
EXTENSIONS — GENERALIZATIONS
We provide here some discussion on the robustness of our main results with respect to
modiﬁcations and generalizations of the model, concentrating on a simpliﬁed version
of it, in which m = 0. Detailed calculations are provided only when necessary for
the reader to follow our arguments. Most details on the analytical derivation of several
straightforward results are omitted here and are available upon request.
Market-Expanding WTP Changes
From equilibrium proﬁts in (8), we can study the effect of changes that increase the total
number of consumers, M. This corresponds to the case in which a better performance
of a product with respect to the environment or public campaigns, aiming at convincing
people that this is so, increases the total number of consumers. It may equally correspond
to a case in which the market grows due to any type of advertising or, even due to
exogenous demographic factors. We can summarize the most interesting implication of
our model for this type of market-expanding changes considering the simpliﬁed version
of the model assumed throughout this section, although the result stated below can be
easily shown to hold under signiﬁcantly less restrictive assumptions.
For the special case in which the more ecological ﬁrm achieves its environmental
performance at no extra cost (due to an intrinsic characteristic of the ﬁrm, rather than
as the result of a costly environmental performance improving process), that is, if c = 0,
it is easy to see that:
• Any growth of the market (higher M) in favor of a more environmentally aware consumer
population (higher L) beneﬁts both ﬁrms, whereas both ﬁrms may even beneﬁt from a
decrease in the consumer population (lower M) in favor of a more environmentally oriented
market (higher L) as long as the product M·L does not decrease.
Therefore, ﬁrms may be interested in increasing consumer heterogeneity even at the
cost of selling to a smaller population of consumers. In fact, this is true for both ﬁrms,
although not necessarily in the symmetric way implied by the speciﬁc assumptions made
here.
Other Extensions
We have assumed that product qualities are exogenously given. We consider here the case
in which ﬁrms strategically determine the environmental performance of their products.
With costless environmental performance (c = 0), it is easy to see from equilibrium
proﬁts that both ﬁrms beneﬁt from maximum differentiation. That is, the producer of the
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standard product will make no effort to improve it, while the green ﬁrm will choose the
best environmental performance it can. With costly environmental performance, things
may be slightly different. For example, the aforementioned maximum quality differenti-
ation result may not hold any more.9 Note, then, that the condition under which the less
environmentally aware ﬁrm prefers a less environmentally aware consumer population
(Proposition 1) coincides with the condition which makes the less ecological ﬁrm earn
higher proﬁts by raising its product’s quality. A simple way to extend the framework
presented here would be to consider a maximum environmental performance Smaxb < Sa
which could be reached by ﬁrm b at no extra cost. When the condition for proﬁtability
of improving the standard product holds (which, following Proposition 1, simultane-
ously implies proﬁtability of a less environmentally aware market for the less ecological
ﬁrm), the less ecological ﬁrm will increase its product’s environmental performance
to Smaxb < Sa, reducing the difference in the environmental performance of the two
varieties. With a costly improvement by ﬁrm b, we obtain a similar result. In any case,
there is always a critical value of L for the corresponding result in Proposition 1 to be
qualitatively robust to the variation considered here.
We could also generalize the framework considering that the extra unit production
cost is a continuous function of the quality improvement achieved by the green product.
That is, c = c(Sa). Furthermore, we will need that c( · ) is increasing in Sa and twice dif-
ferentiable, with c′′ > 0. Assume that the green ﬁrm decides its product’s environmental
performance in a stage preceding the price-setting stage of the game, from ﬁrm a’s equi-
librium proﬁts in (8.1), we get: Hea = d · (2·L·Sa−c(Sa))
2
9Sa
which should be maximized at
the optimum environmental performance improvement S0a , considering that product b’s
quality remains constant. The ﬁrst order condition for this maximization problem gives:
S0a = c2·(c′−L) , which can be shown to satisfy the second order condition if c′′ > − c
′−L
c .
We should observe, then, that S0a is positive as long as L < c
′. In that case, the second
order condition is always satisﬁed for positive values of c′′ (and for some negative values
of it). At the same time, ﬁrm’s proﬁts will be positive as long as L > c′/2 (from substitu-
tion of S0a in Equation (8)). Finally, the less ecological product’s manufacturer will fear
the entry of more environmentally aware consumers if L < 2c′/3 (substituting S0a in the
second condition provided by Proposition 1). That is, for c′/2 < L < 2c′/3, the more
ecological of the two ﬁrm would have incentives to improve its product with respect to
its competitor’s variety by S0a and the less ecological one would fear the entry of more
environmentally aware consumers, whereas, for 2c′/3 < L < c′, the contrary will be
true. An intuitively expected feature of the set-up is that the environmentally aware ﬁrms
would never fear selling to a population of more environmentally aware consumers.10
9 In a framework in which both ﬁrms are allowed to choose qualities, Shaked and Sutton (1982) show
this property of quality choice. Motta (1993) provides different cost conditions (quality may affect
variable or ﬁxed costs) under which less than maximum differentiation occurs in equilibrium.
10 A simple version of this model could be: c(Sa) = k · Sa + g · S2a , for which the high quality ﬁrm’s
equilibrium proﬁt has a unique (the second order condition, 4L − 2k > 3Sag, with g > 0, is
satisﬁed simultaneously with the condition for a positive S0a) maximum at S
0
a = (2L − k)/3g. In
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We may also relax the assumption of the exogenously given asymmetry which assigns
ﬁrms’ roles as green and conventional. Note that, if (2 · L · Sa − c) > (L · Sa + c) ⇒
L > (2c/Sa), in our model (see expressions in (8)), the green manufacturer earns higher
proﬁt than his competitor does. With simultaneous choice of roles, ﬁrms will produce,
in equilibrium (although this asymmetry may require some co-ordination mechanism),
the less and the more ecological product in order to avoid a situation in which they
produce identical varieties yielding zero proﬁts. If one of the two ﬁrms acts ﬁrst and
chooses to produce the ecological product, then, from the aforementioned condition we
can rule out the possibility of a less ecological ﬁrm fearing WTP changes of the second
type. Otherwise, if the ﬁrst ﬁrm to choose produces the less ecological variety, both cases
implied in Proposition 1 are likely to hold.
CONCLUSIONS
Wehave shown that increasing the consumers’WTP for green products is far from a triv-
ial equivalent to “throwingmoney into themarket”, especially, when such increases affect
the heterogeneity of the population. The novelty of our ﬁndings is that socially unde-
sirable increases in consumers’ ecological awareness and the resulting conﬂict between
private and social interests are shown to exist in the absence of consumer misperceptions
or discontinuous changes in market structure.
Our framework is appropriate for assessing, in terms of private proﬁtability and social
welfare, the effects of exogenous factors which are perceived in different ways by con-
sumers with different attitudes towards green products. A rather generic result concerns
the fact that, in most cases, changes in consumers’ WTP that are privately proﬁtable are
not the most desirable in terms of social welfare. In fact, it is easier to obtain interest
compatibility between the two competitors than compatibility between one of the ﬁrms’
proﬁtability and enhancement of social welfare. An apparently counterintuitive result
emerging from the similarity between consumer heterogeneity and product differen-
tiation is that the less ecological manufacturer may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to sell to a more
environmentally aware consumer population. Therefore, less environmentally aware
ﬁrms are also likely to beneﬁt from increasing consumer heterogeneity, rather than —
as it could have been thought — from decreasing the consumer’s WTP for ecological
products.
Although we would not like to exaggerate the possibilities of state intervention in
such detailed qualitative aspects of social trends and consumer-speciﬁc campaigns, it
should be clear that any means of providing the consumer with more information on the
environmental performance of the product they consume should be challenged against
our main ﬁnding: in most cases, ﬁrm strategies would favor socially undesirable cam-
paigns. An immediate policy implication of our main result is that governments should
this example, the condition for positive proﬁts to both ﬁrms becomes: L > k/2 and the condition
in Proposition 1: L > 2k. Finally, the high quality ﬁrm will always ﬁnd markets with more quality
conscious consumers more proﬁtable: ∂H
e
a
∂L
∣∣∣
M=Cons. > 0 ⇔
4(k+4L)(k−2L)2
243gL2
> 0.
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be favorable towards awareness-enhancing campaigns targeted towards the least ecologi-
cally conscious consumers. On the contrary, private campaigns targeted towards themost
ecologically aware consumers should be seen as mere competition-relaxing devices. The
widespread optimism inspired by the worldwide tendency of consumers to increasingly
favor ecological products is justiﬁed only in the presence of simultaneous decreases in
consumer heterogeneity.
The scope of our approach is limited to demonstrating the existence of parameter con-
ﬁgurations under which some apparently plausible results do not hold, like for example
the global desirability of increasing the consumer’s ecological awareness, or the compat-
ibility between a green ﬁrm’s proﬁtability and maximization of social welfare. In order
to achieve our goal, we have used a very stylized model of duopolistic vertical differenti-
ation, whose properties may not carry over intact to other, more general market settings.
The robustness of our results with respect to further generalizations apart from the
ones considered here and the numerous applications of this very simple framework to
study other issues related with changing the consumers’ attitude towards environmental
performance, leave a lot of space for future research.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows the requirement that equilibrium quan-
tities in Equation (7) are positive, implying inequalities: (i) (2n − m) · Sa − c > 0 and
(ii) c − (2m− n) ·Sa > 0. Condition (i) can be re-written -substituting 2n with 2(m+L),
as: (m + 2L) · Sa − c > 0. This implies that the ﬁrst of the four expressions in (9.1)
is positive. In a similar way, we obtain that the sign of the second expression is always
negative, given that condition (ii) can be written — substituting n with m + L — as:
(m − L) · Sa − c < 0. Finally, given the unambiguous signs of these two expressions,
the sign of the third and fourth expressions in (9.1) will depend on the signs of the
remaining brackets appearing on each one of the corresponding numerators. Thus, the
third expression will be positive as long as (m − 2L)Sa − c < 0, which follows from
(m − L)Sa − c < 0 (already shown above). The fourth expression’s sign will be the
opposite of the sign of (m + L)Sa − c, which can also be written as n · Sa − c, as stated
in the proposition. Inspection of signs in (9.2) requires (given condition i) observing
that the sign of the ﬁrst expression is positive if the ﬁrst term in bracket on the numer-
ator is negative (as stated in the proposition). Finally, the use of the second condition
(ii) implies that the second term in brackets on the numerator is positive. Given that due
to: (i), c − (2n − m)Sa < 0 ⇒ c − (2n − m)Sa − L · Sa < 0, the second term in brackets
is negative, implying c− (3n−2m)Sa < 0, corresponding to an unambiguously negative
sign of the second expression as needed for the proof of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Treating the product M · R as a constant, we obtain:
∂SW
∂m
= M
9L
· (7L + 3 − 5(c − m)) (A.1)
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∂SW
∂L
= M
18L2
· (8L2 + 6(c − m) − 5(c − m)2) (A.2)
Also,
∂2SW
∂m2
= 5M
9L
> 0 (A.3)
∂2SW
∂L2
= M
9L3
· (c − m) · (5(c − m) − 6) > 0 (A.4)
provided that 5 · (c − m) > 6. The roots of the equations ∂SW
∂m = 0, ∂SW∂L = 0 are,
respectively,m∗ = 5c−7L−35 (which is positive if 5c > 7L+3), andL∗ =
√
(c−m)[5(c−m)−6]
8
(which corresponds to a real number as long as the content of the square root is positive,
guaranteed, among other, by c > m and [5(c − m)] > 6). The expressions of the second
derivatives in (A.3) and (A.4) indicate that m∗ and L∗, correspond to local minima of
equilibrium social welfare. In case m∗, L∗ do not fall within the support of the model,
social welfare is unambiguously positively affected by changes of the ﬁrst two types.
Regarding the welfare effects of the third type of changes, we follow the methodology
adopted in the previous section, expressing social welfare in terms of m and n. Given
the limited insights which can be drawn from the resulting expressions, rather than
re-writing SW in terms of m and n, we will focus on the derivatives:
∂SW
∂m
= M · 
18(n − m)2 (A.5)
in which, for simplicity, we substituted  = 6n2 − 6c + 5c2 + m2 + 6n − 10cn − 2mn,
and
∂2SW
∂m2
= M(n − c)(6 − 5(n − c))
9(n − m)3 > 0 (A.6)
if 5 · (n−c) < 6. This condition is compatible with the necessary condition for inequality
(A.4) to hold, if c > (n−m)/2, which implies a relatively low heterogeneity compared to
the extra unit production costs to be justiﬁed. However, Equations (A.5) and (A.6) imply
that SW is a strictly increasing function of m, taking positive values for all non-negative
values of the parameter (a more detailed proof is available from the authors). 
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